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A conceptual framework for nonkin food
sharing: timing and currency of beneﬁts
J E FF R E Y R. ST E V E NS & IA N C . G I L BY

Department of Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior, University of Minnesota
(Received 2 December 2002; initial acceptance 4 March 2003;
ﬁnal acceptance 24 April 2003; MS. number: ARV-24R)

Many animal species, from arthropods to apes, share food. This paper presents a new framework that
categorizes nonkin food sharing according to two axes: (1) the interval between sharing and receiving the
beneﬁts of sharing, and (2) the currency units in which beneﬁts accrue to the sharer (especially food versus
nonfood). Sharers can obtain immediate beneﬁts from increased foraging efﬁciency, predation avoidance,
mate provisioning, or manipulative mutualism. Reciprocity, trade, status enhancement and group
augmentation can delay beneﬁts. When beneﬁts are delayed or when food is exchanged for nonfood
beneﬁts, maintaining sharing can become more difﬁcult because animals face discounting and currency
conversion problems. Explanations that involve delayed or nonfood beneﬁts may require specialized
adaptations to account for timing and currency-exchange problems. The immediate, selﬁsh ﬁtness beneﬁts
that a sharer may gain through by-product or manipulative mutualism, however, apply to various foodsharing situations across many species and may provide a simpler, more general explanation of sharing.
Ó 2004 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Sharing food appears to exemplify the paradox of altruism: a recipient gains ﬁtness beneﬁts at the expense of
a donor. Despite this apparent altruism, food sharing commonly occurs in nonhuman animals, including insects
(Bolten et al. 1983; Boggs 1995; Vahed 1998), birds
(Heinrich 1988a; Stacey & Koenig 1990; Thiollay 1991;
Evans & Marler 1994), cetaceans (Johnson 1982; Hoelzel
1991), vampire bats, Desmodus rotundus (Wilkinson 1984;
Denault & McFarlane 1995), and other small mammals
(Judd & Sherman 1996; Brotherton et al. 2001). Primates,
in particular, have been well studied (reviewed by Feistner
& McGrew 1989), including prosimians (Gurksy 2000),
New World monkeys (Starin 1978; Ferrari 1987; Feistner &
Price 1990; Perry & Rose 1994; Pastor-Nieto 2001), Old
World monkeys (Kavanagh 1972; Strum 1975, 1981;
Dittus 1984) and apes (Kuroda 1984; de Waal 1989;
Nettelbeck 1998). Many of these and other authors have
used different deﬁnitions of food sharing. Here, we adopt
a relatively broad deﬁnition of sharing: joint use of
monopolizable food items. That is, if an individual can
defend a food item but allows another individual to
consume part of the item, it is considered to be sharing.
Correspondence and present address: J. R. Stevens, 33 Kirkland Street,
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138,
U.S.A. (email: jstevens@wjh.harvard.edu). I. C. Gilby is at 1987 Upper
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0003e3472/03/$30.00/0

This deﬁnition includes both passive (tolerated theft) and
active sharing (facilitated transfer, food recruitment).
Regardless of the method of transfer, the food owner loses
potential ﬁtness beneﬁts by sharing.
Sharing poses an important economic problem in
animal societies. Although apparently altruistic, sharing
typically yields beneﬁts to the food donor either indirectly
through kin selection (Hamilton 1964) or directly through
other mechanisms. Much of animal food sharing probably
results from kin selection or parenteoffspring sharing
(Feistner & McGrew 1989). Because this type of sharing is
well understood, we focus on nonkin explanations of
sharing involving direct ﬁtness beneﬁts to the donor.

Fitness Benefits
Here we review nonkin sharing studies using a conceptual framework partially based on Brown’s (1980) ﬁtness
components. We divide ﬁtness beneﬁts for nonkin sharing
along two axes (Table 1). Our ﬁrst axis considers the time
at which the donor receives its beneﬁt: either immediately
following sharing or after a delay. For example, a lioness,
Panthera leo, that just captured a Thompson’s gazelle,
Gazella thomsonii, has two options when another pride
member approaches: she can defend the carcass or allow
the intruding lioness to feed with her. By sharing, the
owner may beneﬁt immediately by avoiding a contest,
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Table 1. Summary of hypotheses and examples of food sharing categorized by timing and currency of benefits
Immediate benefits
Explanation
Food for Increased
food
foraging

Species
Ravens
Hyaenas
Killer whales

Food for Predation
nonfood avoidance
benefits

House sparrows

Mate
Insects
provisioning
Chimpanzees
Harassment

Delayed benefits
Studies

Explanation

Species

Studies

Heinrich 1988a, b, Reciprocity
1989
East & Hofer 1991
Hoelzel 1991;
Guinet et al. 2000

Vampire bats

Elgar 1986

Trade

Vampire bats
Wilkinson 1986
Capuchin monkeys Westergaard & Suomi 1997
Chimpanzees
de Waal 1989, 1997a;
Koyama & Dunbar 1996

Boggs 1995;
Gwynne 1997;
Vahed 1998
Stanford 1998

Status
enhancement

Arabian babblers

Zahavi 1990

Chimpanzees

Boesch & Boesch 1989

Rhesus monkeys Hauser 1992
Chimpanzees
Wrangham 1975;
Goodall 1986

which could result in the loss of the entire carcass or
injury to the owner. Alternatively, sharing may provide
delayed beneﬁts by increasing the survival of the intruding female, thereby raising the chances that she remains
in the group. If larger groups of females can better defend
their cubs from infanticidal males, the lioness may reap
future rewards for sharing.
Categorizing types of sharing by the time at which the
ﬁtness beneﬁt accrues (immediate or delayed) provides an
important distinction. Deferring immediately obtainable
beneﬁts until the future has two primary difﬁculties. First,
delaying beneﬁts trades current ﬁtness for future ﬁtness.
Animals can invest current resources into offspring, but by
delaying beneﬁts, they divert investment into future
offspring. If this delays reproduction, it could reduce
lifetime reproductive success. Second, much can happen
between the time that a food item is shared and the return
beneﬁt accrues. Because of this uncertainty, animals may
discount the value of delayed beneﬁts (Mazur 1987;
Rachlin 2000), thus increasing the perceived value of
immediate beneﬁts. That is, animals may prefer smaller,
immediate beneﬁts to larger, delayed beneﬁts. This preference may cause animals to devalue food up to 50% in
the ﬁrst second of delay (Mazur 2000). Discounting plays
an important role in food sharing because food items
are often ephemeral (Stephens & Krebs 1986). Explanations that rely on these delayed beneﬁts may require
complicated mechanisms to overcome the problem of
discounting.
Our second axis considers the ﬁtness currency of the
beneﬁt received by the donor. The donor can either
receive more food as a result of sharing or receive another
type of beneﬁt such as grooming, predation avoidance, or
mating opportunities. In the lion example, the owner that
shares to avoid the contest and possible loss of the carcass
gives up part of her food to consume more food: the
returned beneﬁt currency is the same. Yet, the owner that

Wilkinson 1984;
Denault & McFarlane 1995
Capuchin monkeys de Waal 1997b, 2000
Chimpanzees
de Waal 1989;
Mitani & Watts 1999, 2001

Group
Scrub-jays
augmentation
Meerkats

Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1978;
Brown 1980, 1987
Clutton-Brock 2002

shares to maintain a large group size exchanges food for
another currency: increased cub survival.
Classifying ﬁtness effects based on the currency of
the received beneﬁt allows us to consider whether the
food donors must convert between ﬁtness currencies
(the biological market effect: Noë & Hammerstein 1994,
1995; Noë et al. 2001). How does one bite of food convert
into decreasing predation risk, increasing the probability
of mating, reducing harassment costs, lowering parasite
load, acquiring higher rank, or increasing group size? We
do not suggest that animals consciously calculate these
conversions; rather, natural selection favours individuals
that make appropriate conversions. Nevertheless, variation in amounts of food donated and values of returned
beneﬁts may require ﬂexible, complicated rules to convert
between variable beneﬁts. Some argue that the complexity
of these trading networks drove the evolution of the
human brain (La Cerra & Bingham 1998).
Despite the importance of timing and currency on
ﬁtness, few studies have satisfactorily considered these
aspects in food sharing. We argue that these factors
inﬂuence the complexity of hypotheses used to explain
sharing. Therefore, this framework can help us evaluate
which hypotheses provide the most parsimonious explanations of sharing.

IMMEDIATE BENEFITS
Immediate beneﬁts accrue during or directly following the
sharing event. Occasionally, classifying beneﬁts as immediate or delayed proves difﬁcult; some types of beneﬁts
can seem to occur both immediately and after a delay.
Nevertheless, a clear difference often distinguishes between beneﬁts that accrue during or immediately following sharing and those that accrue after a time delay.

REVIEW

Food for Food

Food for Nonfood Benefits

Increased foraging efficiency

Predation avoidance

Although it may appear to be counterintuitive, individuals may actually increase their foraging efﬁciency by
sharing food with other individuals. This occurs most
often through recruitment calling. In some species, individuals that have information about the location of food
give speciﬁc calls that attract nearby foragers. The callers
do not necessarily possess food but alert others to the
location of food, effectively sharing food.
Richner & Heeb (1995, 1996) proposed the ‘recruitment
centre’ hypothesis as a selﬁsh alternative to Ward &
Zahavi’s (1973) altruistic ‘information centre’ explanation
of communal roosts. Richner & Heeb contended that
recruitment calling actually beneﬁts the caller by immediately increasing its capture rate. Brown et al. (1991)
supported this claim by observing that cliff swallows,
Hirundo pyrrhonota, attract conspeciﬁcs with food calls.
Because individuals in a group have higher prey capture
rates than singletons (Brown & Brown 1996), callers may
recruit group members to increase individual foraging
efﬁciency. Larger group sizes may also lower individual
vigilance for predators (Lima & Dill 1990), thereby
allowing more time for foraging.
In addition to increasing baseline capture rate, recruiting can allow individuals to form groups that displace
food owners, thereby providing access to otherwise inaccessible food sources. Probably one of the most celebrated
cases of this is raven, Corvus corax, recruitment calling at
large carcasses. Heinrich and colleagues (Heinrich 1988a, b,
1989; Heinrich & Marzluff 1991, 1995) described situations in which juvenile ravens give recruitment calls before
feeding at large carcasses. After eliminating reciprocal altruism and kin selection as possible explanations
(Heinrich 1988b; Marzluff & Heinrich 1991; Parker et al.
1994), Heinrich and colleagues proposed that by-product
mutualism (West-Eberhard 1975; Brown 1983) probably
explains the sharing. By recruiting other ravens, juveniles
can overwhelm the defences of adult territory holders,
thereby gaining access to the otherwise inaccessible carcass
(Heinrich 1988a, 1989).
By increasing call rate as they approach lions at a kill,
spotted hyaenas, Crocuta crocuta, also appear to recruit
others to take over a carcass (Holekamp et al. 2000). Larger
group sizes allow them to supplant nonclan members as
well as other species such as lions and leopards, Panthera
pardus (East & Hofer 1991). Although lions may not actively recruit other pride members when defending a
carcass from hyaenas (C. Packer, personal communication), sharing with pride members may allow them to
defend their kill more effectively, thereby reducing their
chances of losing the entire kill (Cooper 1991).
Killer whales, Orcinus orca, may increase their foraging
efﬁciency by sharing the carcasses of pinnipeds and other
cetaceans (Hoelzel 1991; Guinet et al. 2000). Guinet et al.
(2000) hypothesized that they may share to maintain
buoyancy of large carcasses. If a single killer whale feeds
solitarily, the carcass may quickly sink in deep water. By
sharing, multiple whales can keep the carcass aﬂoat,
allowing individual foragers to consume more.

In addition to increasing capture rate, recruitment
calling may yield immediate beneﬁts in a currency other
than food, such as reduced predation risk. By recruiting
others, an individual feeds in a group rather than solitarily, potentially diluting predation risk, increasing predator detection, and confusing predators (Lima & Dill 1990;
Krause & Ruxton 2002). Elgar (1986) found that house
sparrows, Passer domesticus, give more recruitment calls in
the presence of divisible food; however, call rate decreases
dramatically as ﬂock size increases. This suggests that the
birds may recruit others to dilute their own predation risk
only when food is shareable and risk is high for solitary
foragers.
Models of sharing under predation risk predict that
sharing/recruiting can immediately beneﬁt individuals
through predation avoidance. Newman & Caraco (1989)
modelled recruitment calling situations in which risk of
starvation and group predation risk vary. Recruiting is
evolutionarily stable when predation risk decreases with
group size; therefore, calling beneﬁts solitary individuals
by increasing group size and diluting risk. In another set
of models, provisioning unrelated offspring at a nearby
nest quiets begging calls, thereby reducing the chance of
attracting predators. By sharing with unrelated offspring,
an individual may decrease predation risk for its own
young (Caraco & Brown 1986; Giraldeau & Caraco 2000).

Mate provisioning
In many species of insects, birds and mammals, males
acquire and donate food to females either before, during,
or after copulation (termed mate provisioning, courtship
feeding, nuptial gift giving, or meat-for-sex). Males may
relinquish body parts, produce glandular secretions, or
share prey or other food to gain ﬁtness beneﬁts via natural
and sexual selection (reviewed in Lack 1940; Thornhill
1976; Boggs 1995; Gwynne 1997; Vahed 1998).
Naturally selected ﬁtness beneﬁts of mate provisioning
act primarily on survival. In several insect species, females
cannibalize males during or after copulation. Provisioning
the female may distract her from cannibalizing the male,
thereby increasing his probability of survival and facilitating the transfer of sperm (Gwynne 1997). Provisioning
may also offer paternal investment by providing nutritional support for the female. Providing food has a direct
effect on female fecundity in many species of insects and
birds by increasing egg number, egg size and offspring
weight (Nisbet 1973; Newton 1979; Gwynne 1982; Lifjeld
& Slagsvold 1986; Moore et al. 2000).
Sexual selection may also maintain mate provisioning
via sperm competition and female choice. Males of many
insect species donate an edible gelatinous mass (spermatophylax) in addition to a sperm sac during mating.
Sakaluk (1984) suggested that provisioning female crickets, Gryllodes supplicans, allows enough time for the
ejaculate to transfer out of the sperm sac before she can
feed on the sperm. Other researchers propose that the
spermatophylax may prevent future mating by releasing
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refractory chemicals, plugging or ﬁlling the reproductive
tract, or releasing chemicals that render foreign sperm
inviable (Gwynne 1986). Probably the most common
explanation of mate provisioning is mate attraction. Males
share food with females to entice them to mate, and
sharing may signal the male’s ﬁtness and paternal investment. Feeding females often increases copulation rate
(Tasker & Mills 1981; Vahed 1998; Mougeot 2000;
González-Solı́s et al. 2001) and mate retention (Tasker &
Mills 1981) in insects and birds.
In chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, males capture monkeys
and may give meat to females, possibly in exchange for
mating access (meat-for-sex hypothesis). A male chimpanzee may occasionally withhold meat from a sexually
receptive female until he has mated with her, and only
then allow her to obtain a portion (Goodall 1986; Stanford
1998). Sexually receptive females may receive more meat
from males than expected by chance (Teleki 1973, 1981).
Stanford and others (Stanford et al. 1994; Stanford 1998)
interpreted this as evidence that males trade meat for
mating. However, Goodall (1986) and Teleki (1973, 1981)
demonstrated that sexually receptive females are more
persistent in their efforts to obtain meat (i.e. high
harassment), possibly explaining their increased success.
Kuroda (1984) showed that female bonobos, Pan paniscus,
obtain more food from males if they ﬁrst copulate with
them.
Other studies of chimpanzees have failed to ﬁnd a
relationship between food and mating, instead ﬁnding
no preferences for sexually receptive females (I. C. Gilby,
unpublished data) or, more importantly, no effect of
sharing on male reproductive success (Hemelrijk et al.
1992, 1999; Mitani & Watts 2001). Rather than sharing in
return for an immediate copulation, a male chimpanzee
may share to establish an afﬁliative relationship with a
female, increasing the chances of mating later. In the
chimpanzees at Gombe National Park, Tanzania, a male’s
frequency of involvement in consortships (exclusive
mating relationships) positively correlates with the frequency with which he shares food with females (Tutin
1979). However, it remains unknown whether sharing
with a particular female increases the chances of consorting with that female. This possibility of future rewards
suggests that mate provisioning can provide both immediate and delayed beneﬁts.

Harassment and manipulative mutualism
Sharing may occur because begging reduces the ﬁtness
of the owner. Owners beneﬁt by sharing part of the food
with the beggar to avoid injury and energetic or opportunity costs. Blurton Jones (1984, 1986, 1987) proposed
the ‘tolerated theft’ hypothesis for sharing, contending
that if the ﬁtness beneﬁt of consuming a packet of food
follows a diminishing returns function, later bites of food
provide less ﬁtness beneﬁt than earlier bites. Therefore, if
a hungry beggar encounters a partially satiated owner, an
asymmetry in hunger level exists. Parker’s (1974) model
predicted that individuals that gain more from a resource
should ﬁght more vigorously, forcing the partially satiated
owner to acquiesce and share with the beggar. Other

theoretical (Winterhalder 1996b) and observational
(Kuroda 1984; Goodall 1986; Perry & Rose 1994) studies
support the effect of satiation on sharing. However, an
empirical study manipulating satiation level of the beggar
found no increase in begging or sharing with hungry
beggars (Nissen & Crawford 1936).
Blurton Jones’ model only considered what happens
in the presence of an asymmetry in satiation between the
players. The tolerated theft model does not explain sharing that occurs when both players are equally hungry.
Harassment can inﬂuence sharing in the presence or
absence of a satiation asymmetry. Wrangham (1975) ﬁrst
emphasized the importance of harassment (or ‘sharing
under pressure’) when studying the Gombe chimpanzees.
He suggested that a food possessor ‘may use the parts that
he does not need to reduce the costs of possession by
‘‘paying’’ other individuals to go away’ (page 4.57). Moore
(1984) proposed that this threat of attack from a beggar
may be very costly for an owner and offered a graphical
model of how costs of harassment (both physical and
social) can inﬂuence sharing. Stevens & Stephens (2002)
used game theory to formalize the ﬁrst mathematical
model of the effects of harassment on sharing. They predicted that the defensibility of a food source may inﬂuence
harassment by beggars; if beggars can obtain scraps,
harassment may be worthwhile; if beggars harass intensely
enough, they may inﬂict such costs on owners that sharing
becomes the best strategy (manipulative mutualism).
To demonstrate the viability of harassment as an explanation of food sharing, two predictions must hold: (1)
harassment must be costly to the owner and (2) increasing
harassment should increase the probability of the beggar
accessing food. Harassment can include extending a hand
towards an owner, vocalizing, slapping the ground, grabbing at food, or attacking the owner (Nissen & Crawford
1936; Schessler & Nash 1977; Goodall 1986; Perry & Rose
1994; Westergaard et al. 1998), possibly injuring the
owner or forcing the owner to expend energy by retaliating or moving away (Wrangham 1975; Fragaszy &
Mason 1983; Goodall 1986). Harassment may also impose
opportunity costs associated with a reduced intake rate
and the potential to lose all of the resource to the beggars.
Hauser (1992) revealed that rhesus macaques, Macaca
mulatta, that give recruitment calls experience less aggression and consume more food than those that do not
recruit. Therefore, the harassment associated with not
recruiting is more costly (in terms of food consumed) than
the food shared after recruiting.
For food sharing to occur, the costs of harassment to the
owner must outweigh the potential beneﬁt lost by sharing
(Stevens & Stephens 2002); therefore, more intense harassment should elicit more sharing. Many observational
studies suggest that begging more intensely increases
sharing (Nissen & Crawford 1936; Teleki 1973; Wrangham
1975; Kuroda 1984; Takahata et al. 1984; Boesch & Boesch
1989; I. C. Gilby, unpublished data) and more beggars
elicit more sharing (Fruth & Hohmann 2002). In addition,
an empirical study indicates that squirrel monkey, Saimiri
boliviensis, and chimpanzee food owners share four times
more often with individuals that harass than with those
that do not harass (Stevens 2004).
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DELAYED BENEFITS
Animals may recoup the beneﬁts of sharing following the
sharing event. This beneﬁt can accrue after several seconds
or potentially after several months. The amount of time
between sharing and recouping the beneﬁt plays an important role in the evolution of sharing, especially in
short-lived animals. The bias towards primates presented
here reﬂects the status of the literature for delayed-beneﬁt
hypotheses of sharing.

Food for Food
Reciprocity
One of the more popular explanations of food sharing is
reciprocal altruism (or reciprocity), which states that an
animal may perform a costly act that beneﬁts another if
the recipient returns the favour later (Trivers 1971). Computer models suggest that reciprocity is evolutionarily
stable (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981), but it proves challenging to test directly, chieﬂy because of the difﬁculty in
measuring the costs and beneﬁts to ﬁtness (Seyfarth &
Cheney 1988). Relatively few studies test reciprocal altruism in a food-sharing context, and most fail to establish
its importance in sharing. Some demonstrate a reciprocal
sharing pattern, but do not consider that such patterns
can emerge as by-products of other mechanisms. For instance, if two individuals demonstrate symmetrical attraction or aversion to each other, and such positive or
negative association affects food-sharing behaviour, then
a reciprocal distribution of sharing will result, even
though reciprocal altruism does not explain why they
share food (de Waal & Luttrell 1988; de Waal 2000;
Brosnan & de Waal 2002). As an example, consider a pair of
unrelated male chimpanzees that are inseparable. When
potential food-sharing situations arise, both members of
the pair tend to share because the other harasses. Because
these two individuals spend more time with each other
than with other individuals, their mutualistic sharing
will appear reciprocal. This ‘symmetry-based’ reciprocity
may explain food sharing in wild chimpanzees (Mitani &
Watts 1999, 2001; Watts & Mitani 2002), vampire bats
(Wilkinson 1984; Denault & McFarlane 1995) and captive
tufted capuchins, Cebus apella (de Waal et al. 1993; de
Waal 1997b). Although symmetry-based reciprocity implies reciprocal sharing, it does not necessarily involve
precise accounting of costs and beneﬁts required in
traditional or ‘calculated’ reciprocity.
Other examples of reciprocal sharing adjust for symmetry-based reciprocity. For instance, in one study, captive
chimpanzees showed a reciprocal sharing pattern, even
after statistically adjusting for association patterns (de
Waal 1989). Nevertheless, this correlational study identiﬁed long-term reciprocal relationships (over all trials, A
tended to share with B and vice versa), but did not
manipulate ownership and assess the effects of sharing in
the next trial. In an experiment with captive capuchins,
de Waal (2000) found that if individual A shared
frequently with individual B in one particular trial, then
B tended to share frequently with A in the next trial. de
Waal concluded that the events of the ﬁrst stage ‘set the

tone’ for the second; if A was nice, then B would be nice
too. Unlike traditional reciprocity, such ‘attitudinal reciprocity’ does not require ‘strict contingency between
given and received services’ and therefore proves less
cognitively demanding (de Waal 2000, page 260). The
general relevance of attitudinal reciprocity remains unclear. No studies have convincingly documented calculated reciprocity.
Negative reciprocity. Another variation on reciprocal altruism is ‘negative reciprocity’ or punishment. In this
case, an animal punishes by inﬂicting a ﬁtness cost on a
defecting (noncooperative) opponent, discouraging future
defection (Boyd & Richerson 1992; Clutton-Brock &
Parker 1995a). Punishment differs from harassment because punishment involves delayed rather than immediate beneﬁts. Beneﬁts accrue in future interactions when
opponents learn the contingencies of punishment and
switch to cooperation. Although common in contexts
such as mate guarding (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995b),
the effect of aggression on future food sharing is not well
studied in nonhuman animals.

Food for Nonfood Benefits
Trade
Strict reciprocal altruism, as discussed above, assumes
that reciprocation occurs in the same ﬁtness currency as
the original act. The trade hypothesis also assumes reciprocal exchange, but reciprocation occurs in a different
currency (Noë & Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Noë et al.
2001). For example, players may exchange food for social
favours such as grooming or support in a dominance
conﬂict. As with reciprocity, this concept proves challenging to test directly because of the difﬁculty in measuring
the relative ﬁtness value of different currencies. Is grooming actually costly to perform? However, a few studies
indicate that trade may elicit food-sharing behaviour for
some species.
Blood sharing among vampire bats may depend on
grooming. Wilkinson (1986) found that grooming frequency correlates positively with blood-sharing frequency.
However, grooming may also allow the bats to assess
whether an individual has recently fed, to determine the
likelihood of receiving a regurgitated meal (Wilkinson
1986).
Studies of captive monkeys show that some species may
trade food for other currencies. In one experiment with
captive tufted capuchins, subjects in one group transferred
stones to subjects in a second group, who used the stones
as tools to access food (Westergaard & Suomi 1997).
Subjects in the second group then transferred food to
subjects in the ﬁrst group. Despite the appearance of
trading tools for food, food transfer occurred at a similar
rate whether or not tools were needed, indicating that
trade did not explain sharing. de Waal & Berger (2000)
demonstrated trade in captive capuchins, suggesting that
food owners that received help in a cooperative task
tended to share food more frequently. In a study with
captive spider monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi, the frequency of
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dyadic grooming correlated positively with cofeeding at
a monopolizable feeder, suggesting that grooming inﬂuenced tolerance at the feeding site (Pastor-Nieto 2001).
In a study with captive chimpanzees, food possessors
tolerated frequent grooming partners more often, allowing them to passively acquire food (Koyama & Dunbar
1996). In another study, individual A shared more frequently with B if B had groomed A earlier in the day, but
not after A had groomed B (de Waal 1989, 1997a). After
food-sharing trials, possessors groomed individuals with
whom they had shared less frequently than those with
whom they had not shared (de Waal 1997a). This supplies
the strongest evidence that chimpanzees may trade food
for grooming, because the temporal pattern of taking
turns exchanging grooming and food prevents one
individual from gaining all of the beneﬁts (de Waal 1989).
Some studies of wild chimpanzees also support the idea
of trade. Nishida et al. (1992) showed that the frequency
with which chimpanzees obtain meat from the alpha
male correlates positively with the total amount of time
they spend grooming with the alpha. Additionally, the
alpha male tends to support those males with whom he
has frequently shared meat during their dominance conﬂicts with other males. The authors concluded that
chimpanzees use meat sharing to maintain coalitions,
with the alpha male effectively trading meat for grooming
and dominance support. While suggestive, this study does
not rule out symmetry-based reciprocity, because an index
of proximity correlated positively with the frequency with
which individuals obtained meat from the alpha male.
Others also argue that chimpanzees use meat as a social
or political tool to build coalitionary support (Mitani &
Watts 2001) and to ‘reward allies and snub rivals’
(Stanford 1998, 1999). Several researchers have suggested
that chimpanzees hunt to provide highly prized items to
trade (Stanford et al. 1994; Mitani & Watts 2001). These
authors, however, have provided no data concerning the
opportunity to receive meat. Perhaps only grooming
partners or allies attempt to get meat from a possessor,
and possessors share meat because of other mechanisms,
such as harassment.

Show-off/status enhancement
Food sharing may serve as a costly display that advertises an animal’s social status. For example, meat is energetically costly and risky for chimpanzees to acquire (Boesch
1994), so sharing with others may advertise an individual’s strength and health. Such a signal may intimidate
rivals or attract mates. When seen begging, an individual
appears weak, in essence giving up a unit of social status
for a nutritional beneﬁt (Moore 1984). Also, simply possessing a desirable food item may draw positive attention
to an individual (Teleki 1973; Rijksen 1978), thus raising
its social status.
As with the other cognitively complex hypotheses, the
status enhancement hypothesis proves difﬁcult to test.
Proper assessment of the status enhancement hypothesis
requires a long-term study that tracks both an individual’s
changes in social status and sharing patterns (de Waal
1989). Apart from anecdotes (Boesch & Boesch 1989),

little evidence supports meat sharing to enhance status
in chimpanzees (de Waal 1989); however, some support
comes from work with Arabian babblers, Turdoides
squamiceps. These birds maintain a strict dominance
hierarchy, in which dominant individuals feed insects to
subordinates. Adults appear to compete to feed each other,
and interfere when subordinates try to feed others (Zahavi
1990). When fed by a subordinate, a dominant male
usually responds with aggression. Typically, the alpha
male seeks out and feeds the beta male. Zahavi interpreted
this sharing as a display, and the acceptance of food
decreases the social status of the recipient.

Group augmentation
The cooperative breeding literature ﬁrst introduced
the concept of group augmentation (Woolfenden &
Fitzpatrick 1978; Brown 1980; Wiley & Rabenold 1984;
Brown 1987), although Kropotkin (1908) and Trivers
(1971) alluded to these ideas earlier. By aiding unrelated
individuals, a helper increases the group size, which may
provide some future beneﬁt (e.g. group territory defence
in lions: Grinnell et al. 1995; Heinsohn & Packer 1995).
Because the cooperator gains future beneﬁts, this type of
delayed mutualism resists cheaters; cheaters have smaller
group sizes and therefore reduced future ﬁtness (Kokko
et al. 2001; Packer et al. 2001; Clutton-Brock 2002).
Lima (1989) modelled a similar situation of this ‘mutual
dependence’ in which an individual’s ﬁtness depends on
the presence of another group member, which in turn,
depends on the actions of the individual. If an individual
defects in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, its partner will
probably not survive to the next round. If the probability
of ﬁnding another partner is low, the defector could face
a much higher predation risk as a singleton. Therefore, by
cooperating, an individual increases its group size and
reduces the future risk of predation.
Most examples of group augmentation still come from
the cooperative breeding literature (reviewed in CluttonBrock 2002). Although helping in cooperative breeders
frequently involves group territory defence, predator
vigilance and babysitting, offspring provisioning plays
a large role. Often the helpers are closely related to the
offspring but not always (Stacey & Koenig 1990; Cockburn
1998). Because of the frequency of helping unrelated
offspring in meerkats, Suricata suricatta, Clutton-Brock and
colleagues proposed group augmentation as a possible
explanation for such cooperativeness. Helping increases
pup growth and survival, thereby increasing group size
(Clutton-Brock et al. 2001). Large group sizes offer direct
beneﬁts to helpers such as lower predation risk (CluttonBrock et al. 1999) and a pool of potential helpers when the
current helpers begin to breed (Brotherton et al. 2001).
A similar increase in offspring number and adult survival
associated with larger group size occurs in dwarf mongooses, Helogale parvula (Rood 1990).
Wilkinson (1992) suggested that communal nursing in
evening bats, Nycticeius humeralis, may increase colony
size and reduce predation risk. However, this ‘milk
dumping’ could also have the immediate effect of reducing weight and decreasing energetic costs for foraging
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(Roulin 2002). Extreme forms of group augmentation may
include adopting or even kidnapping (and therefore provisioning) unrelated offspring to increase their group size
(Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1984; Zahavi 1990; Heinsohn
1991), possibly to ensure the presence of helpers when
they breed (Connor & Curry 1995).

DISCUSSION
This framework implies the important theoretical point
that all of these explanations are not equally likely among
animal species. The nature of delayed and exchanged beneﬁts requires specialized adaptations, limiting the number of
species that can reap these types of beneﬁts.

Limitations of Hypotheses
The framework presented here indicates that a complete
study of food sharing requires synthesizing the current
functional explanations with potential cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, evaluating the underlying psychological
constraints on animals can provide important insights
into the applicability of certain hypotheses. Given that
not all hypotheses will apply to all species, we can
consider speciﬁc limitations for each hypothesis.

Increased foraging, predation avoidance
and group augmentation
All three of these hypotheses share the following result:
sharing food increases group size, which in turn, increases
individual ﬁtness. The beneﬁts of membership in a group
have been well documented (Bertram 1978; Rubenstein
1982; Packer & Ruttan 1988; Krause & Ruxton 2002);
therefore, sharing to increase group size can be quite common among group-living species. We should not, however, expect these hypotheses to explain sharing in solitary
or pair-bonded species. In addition, these types of sharing
may be limited to large, shareable resources (Hauser &
Wrangham 1987; Hauser et al. 1993). Elgar’s (1986) study
emphasizes this point by showing that house sparrows
recruit others to a divisible/shareable pile of bread crumbs
more often than to a solid/nonshareable piece of bread
equivalent in mass. These rather minor restrictions indicate that the ‘increase group size’ hypotheses could
explain many instances of sharing, but chieﬂy in social,
cooperatively breeding, or predatory birds and mammals.

Mate provisioning
The distinction between precopulatory and postcopulatory mate provisioning is an important one. Precopulatory
provisioning probably occurs most often in species with
strong intersexual selection; females can then use the provisioned food as a signal of the male’s ﬁtness. Provisioning
following copulation beneﬁts monogamous species in
which parental investment is crucial. Therefore, mate provisioning could be quite common given the beneﬁt to both
promiscuous and monogamous species. Nevertheless, it has
been described mostly in insects, birds, cooperatively
breeding mammals (Mech et al. 1999), and chimpanzees.

Harassment
Harassment has very few constraints. Two complete
strangers can ﬁnd themselves in a situation in which
harassment can elicit sharing. Simple instrumental learning of aversive stimuli (Thorndike 1911; Skinner 1938)
can condition animals to avoid harassment. How widespread is harassment? Primates have been the focus of
most sharing studies, and harassment appears to be ubiquitous among them, occurring in titi monkeys, squirrel
monkeys, capuchins, macaques, gibbons, bonobos and
chimpanzees. Harassment also occurs in several bird
species (Amat 2000) but is often referred to as ‘scrounging’
(Barnard & Sibly 1981; Giraldeau & Caraco 2000; Ha et al.
2003). Harassment and begging are almost universal
across taxa that feed altricial offspring (reviewed in Kilner
& Johnstone 1997). Extreme forms of harassment such as
kleptoparasitism or food stealing may extend beyond
sharing, but they are very common types of food interactions (Brockmann & Barnard 1979; Furness 1987;
Durant 2000).

Reciprocity and trade
Timing of beneﬁts could limit reciprocity and trade as
general explanations of cooperation because discounting
can devalue future reciprocated acts (May 1981). Studies
on humans and nonhuman animals verify the effect of
discounting on cooperation (Green et al. 1995; Baker &
Rachlin 2002; Harris & Madden 2002; Stephens et al.
2002). Trivers (1971) emphasized the importance of
timing in his original model:
The time lag is the crucial factor, for it means that only under
highly specialized circumstances can the altruist be reasonably
guaranteed that the causal chain he initiates with his altruistic
act will eventually return to him and confer, directly or
indirectly, its beneﬁt (Trivers 1971, page 39).
Reciprocity theory must account for discounting of future
beneﬁts. In addition to requiring multiple interactions
and individual recognition, reciprocity requires a low discounting rate and complex cognitive skills to track debts
owed and favours given. In addition, trade requires the ability to exchange between two or more ﬁtness currencies.
How animals value and compare different types of beneﬁts is poorly understood. Humans and some other species
of primates may possess the skills necessary to reciprocate and trade (Kaplan & Hill 1985; Winterhalder 1996a;
Bliege Bird & Bird 1997; Brosnan & de Waal 2002; Hauser
et al. 2003), but these explanations probably do not
account for cooperative behaviour in most nonhuman
animals.

Status enhancement
The status enhancement hypothesis suffers from the
previously mentioned problems of deferred beneﬁts. The
cumulative nature of increasing status requires a delay
before beneﬁts are realized. This should involve discounting of the sharer’s return beneﬁt, as well as memory
constraints for other group members (status is, after all,
relative to others). However, other types of investment in
status (such as ritualized displays or contests) also delay
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the return beneﬁt and are quite common. It appears as
though some animals use specialized techniques to assess
status (Cheney & Seyfarth 1990), so the delayed beneﬁts
are not discounted heavily. Despite the ubiquity of
dominance hierarchies and other status-assessing mechanisms, evidence of using food sharing to raise status is
restricted to only a few species such as babblers, ravens
(Heinrich & Marzluff 1991) and chimpanzees.

Future Directions
Historically, research on sharing and cooperation has
primarily focused on explanations involving delayed
beneﬁts. In particular, many theoretical studies have
investigated the role of reciprocity in the evolution of
cooperation (reviewed in Dugatkin 1997); however, aside
from the examples reviewed here, little empirical support
exists for reciprocity in nonhuman animals (Noë 1990;
Connor 1995; Pusey & Packer 1997; Stephens et al. 1997).
We feel that more focus should be placed on simpler but
previously overlooked explanations such as by-product
mutualism, harassment and group augmentation. These
hypotheses can by no means explain all instances of
sharing, but their simplicity permits application to a broad
range of taxa and demands their elimination before
invoking more elaborate hypotheses.
Of course, multiple types of beneﬁts can (and probably
often do) occur simultaneously to shape sharing behaviour. For example, blood sharing in vampire bats could be
an interaction between kin selection, reciprocity and trade
(Wilkinson 1984, 1986; Denault & McFarlane 1995). In
addition, simpler mechanisms could have initiated sharing, allowing the evolution of more elaborate mechanisms
(e.g. food recruitment in ravens could initially have
increased individual foraging efﬁciency but was later coopted into a signal of status). Disentangling these interactions can provide insight into the evolution and
maintenance of sharing behaviour.
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